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Abstract
Security of machine learning models is a concern as they may face adversarial
attacks for unwarranted advantageous decisions. While research on the topic has
mainly been focusing on the image domain, numerous industrial applications, in
particular in finance, rely on standard tabular data. In this paper, we discuss the
notion of adversarial examples in the tabular domain. We propose a formalization
based on the imperceptibility of attacks in the tabular domain leading to an approach
to generate imperceptible adversarial examples. Experiments show that we can
generate imperceptible adversarial examples with a high fooling rate.
1 Introduction
As machine learning becomes more prevalent in many industries, concerns are raised about the
security its usgae. Research has shown that machine learning models are sensitive to slight changes
in their input, resulting in unwarranted predictions, application failures or errors. The Adversarial
Machine Learning field studies this issue with the design of attacks and defenses with an active focus
on the image domain [Goodfellow et al., 2015, Biggio et al., 2013, Kurakin et al., 2017]. However,
many machine learning classifiers in the industry rely on tabular data in input to predict labels in a
wide variety of tasks (e.g. stocks, credit, fraud, etc.).
To illustrate the threat of adversarial attacks in a tabular context, we consider the scenario where a
bank customer applies for a loan. A machine learning model is used to make a decision regarding
the acceptance of the application based on customer provided information (incomes, age, etc.). The
model advises the bank to reject the application of our customer who is determined to get the loan by
filling false information to mislead the model. In this work, we claim that the key for this attack to
succeed is its imperceptibility: the application should remain credible and relevant for a potential
expert eye, in coherence with the model’s prediction. We discuss the notions of imperceptibility and
relevance in order to design an attack relying on the intuition that only a subset of features are critical
for the prediction according to the expert eye (e.g. income, age). Thus, the attacker should minimize
manipulations on this subset for the attack to be imperceptible and instead rely on less important
features to get the model to accept the application. The intuition behind this idea is depicted Figure 1.
In the following section, we discuss the notion of imperceptibility in order to propose a definition for
adversarial examples in the context of tabular data. Using this formalization, we propose in Section 4
NeurIPS 2019 Workshop on Robust AI in Financial Services: Data, Fairness, Explainability, Trustworthiness
and Privacy (Robust AI in FS 2019), Vancouver, Canada.
ar
X
iv
:1
91
1.
03
27
4v
2 
 [s
tat
.M
L]
  1
3 D
ec
 20
19
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Number of pets
10k
20k
30k
40k
50k
60k
70k
80k
Sa
la
ry
Accepted Loan region
Rejected Loan region
Figure 1: Illustration of an imperceptible perturbation to craft an adversarial attack on tabular data.
The plain arrow is a "naive", perceptible, perturbation to cross the decision boundary (e.g. salary for
a loan application). The dashed arrow is an imperceptible perturbation relying on the number of pets.
an approach to generate adversarial examples called LowProFool. To assess these propositions,
we perform experiments on four literature datasets. We show in Section 5 and Section 6 that the
generated adversarial examples have a low perceptibility compared to other adversarial attacks from
the state-of-the-art while the success rate (fooling rate) for the attack is kept high.
2 Imperceptible adversarial attacks on images
Defining the exact properties of an adversarial example remains a subject of debate among the
research community, in particular in terms of imperceptibility of the attack. On the one hand, Carlini
and Wagner define the adversarial example as inputs that are close to natural inputs but classified
incorrectly [Carlini and Wagner, 2017] and Szegedy et al. mention imperceptible non-random
perturbation [Szegedy et al., 2014]. On the other hand, Karmon et al. allow the noise to be visible but
confined to a small, localized patch of the image [Karmon et al., 2018] and Brown et al. generate
a discernible adversarial patch that is stamped on the original picture to make the classifier always
predict the same class [Brown et al., 2017].
While on images it is natural for a human to check whether the model has been fooled by comparing
the image and the output of the classifier, assessing or measuring the perceptibility of the perturbation
is complex. The most commonly used measure is the `p norm. For instance, Szegedy et al.
formalizes the definition of adversarial example and slight perturbation in the image domain as
f(x+r) 6= f(x) with ||r||p < where f is a classifier, x an image and r the adversarial perturbation.
The slight perturbation is controlled by , the upper bound of its amplitude.
However, it is sometimes inaccurate to use the `p norm to assess the perceptibility of a perturbation.
Evidence of that came to light recently when Sharif et al. showed that the `p norm is insufficient to
measure perceptual similarity between two images. The authors studied how images that are really
close in terms of human-observed perceptibility (e.g. rotated versions of the same image) can still
have large differences according to the `p norm. On the contrary, some images may be semantically
different but considered close by this metric [Sharif et al., 2018].
Given these studies on the imperceptibility of attacks on images, in the next section we consider the
specificities of tabular data to formalize the notion of imperceptibility for this context.
3 Formalization of the notion of imperceptible attacks on tabular data
The notion of imperceptibility and the way it can be measured differ for tabular data compared to
images for two main reasons. First, tabular features are not interchangeable like pixels. Second, while
most people can usually tell the correct class of an image and whether it appears altered or not, it is
much complex for tabular data: this type of data is less readable and expert knowledge is required.
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On tabular data, to decide if two instances share the same class, the expert is likely to focus on a
subset of features (among the whole feature space) he considers important for the classification task
(eg. to predict the acquisition of a loan, incomes are more important than other features). Thus, to
detect the presence of any fraudulent modification, the expert is likely to check more thoroughly the
veracity of this subset of features: the attacker should avoid modifications on it. Then, we propose to
measure the perceptibility of an adversarial attack as the `p norm of the perturbation weighted by a
feature importance vector, which describes the likelihood of a feature to be investigated by the expert.
Given that tabular data cannot be manipulated the same way as images, we argue that using the `p
norm is not subject to the same extent to the flaws discussed in Section 2.
Another aspect of the attack that is intrinsically contained in the notion of imperceptibility is the
coherence of the output. While adversarial examples for image data naturally satisfy this constraint
(pixels are defined as integers between 0 and 255), this needs to be enforced for tabular data. In fact,
we expect the generated attacks to lie in natural, intuitive or hard bounds designed by the human
intuition or the knowledge of an expert. If the adversarial example does not satisfy these constraints,
the perturbed features must be bounded and rounded so as to fit into their context: for instance, the
age might be forced into a positive number, or a boolean to be discrete depending on the problem.
To craft adversarial examples, we make the assumption that perturbations on less relevant features
allow to reach the desired opposed class label. In fact, we seek to exploit the discrepancies between
the classifier’s learned vector of feature importance and the expert’s knowledge. The perturbation
is expected to be of a higher lp norm compared to optimal shortest paths to the classifier frontier.
Despite being of higher norm, the perturbation should be less perceptible than another perturbation of
smaller norm but supported by more relevant features for the experts.
Formally, we consider a set of examples X where each example is denoted by x(i) with i ∈ [1...N ]
and associated with a label y(i). The set of examples X is defined by a set of features j ∈ J and
each feature vector is noted xj with j ∈ J = [1...D]. Also we consider f : RD → {0, 1}, a binary
classifier mapping examples to a discrete label l ∈ {0, 1} and d : RD → [0, 1] a mapping between
the perturbation r ∈ RD and its perceptibility value. Finally, we define A ⊆ RD the set of valid,
coherent samples.
For a given x ∈ RD, its original label s = f(x) and a target label t 6= s, we aim at generating the
optimal perturbation vector r∗ ∈ RD such that
r∗ = argmin
r
d(r) for r ∈ RD
s.t. f(x) = s 6= f(x+ r∗) = t and x+ r∗ ∈ A
(1)
As mentioned earlier, each feature j ∈ J is associated to a feature importance coefficient vj ∈ R
gathered in a feature importance vector v = [v1, . . . , vj , . . . , vD] where vj > 0, ∀j ∈ J
We extend the definition of d to include the feature importance v. The perceptibility for tabular data
is then defined as the `p norm of the feature importance weighted perturbation vector, such that:
dv(r) = ||r  v||2p where is the Hadamard product (2)
Finally, in Equation 1, the constraint x + r∗ ∈ A brings the idea of coherence of the generated
adversarial example. The nature of regular tabular data requires that methods respect the discrete,
categorical and continuous features. Each feature must conform with the dataset so as to be as
imperceptible as possible, e.g. the feature age should not be lower than 0.
4 Generation of Imperceptible Adversarial Examples on Tabular Data
Our objective is to craft adversarial examples such that perturbations applied to a tabular data example
are imperceptible to the expert’s eye, i.e. higher perturbations for irrelevant or less important features,
than for relevant ones, as described in Section 3.
Since solving the proposed minimization problem is complex, we propose to define the objective
function as an aggregation of the class change constraint and the minimization of dv:
g(r) = L(x+ r, t) + λ||v  r||p
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Algorithm 1 LowProFool
Input: Classifier f , sample x, target label t, loss function L, trade-off factor λ, feature importance
v, maximum number of iterations N , scaling factor α
Output: Adversarial example x′
1: r ← [0, 0, . . . , 0]
2: x0 ← x
3: for i in 0 . . . N − 1 do
4: ri ← −∇r(L(xi, t) + λ||v  r||p)
5: r ← r + αri
6: xi+1 ← clip(x+ r)
7: end for
8: x′ ← argminxi dv(xi) ∀i ∈ [0 . . . N − 1] s.t. f(xi) 6= f(x0)
9: return x′
With L(x, t) the value of the loss of the model f calculated for x and target class t, and λ > 0. On
the one hand, the regularizer ||v  r||p allows to minimize the perturbation r with respect to its
perceptibility. On the other hand, by minimizing the loss L(x+ r, t), we ensure that the perturbation
leads the perturbed sample towards the target class.
Setting the value of the hyperparameter λ ∈ R allows to control the weight associated to the penalty
of using important features, with respect to the feature importance vector. Given a fixed number of
iterations, our goal is to minimize the weighted norm ||v  r||p associated with each adversarial
example, while maximizing the proportion of samples x ∈ X that could cross the classification
frontier. These two optimization problems constitute a trade-off that is represented by choosing the
right value for λ.
The LowProFool (low profile) algorithm is then defined as an optimization problem in which we
search for the minimum of the objective function g using a gradient descent approach. More
concretely, we make use of the gradient data so as to guide the perturbation towards the target
class in an iterative manner. At the same time, we penalize the perturbation proportionally to the
feature importance associated with the features, so as to minimize the perceptibility of the adversarial
perturbation as defined in Section 3. Algorithm 1 outline LowProFool algorithm for binary classifiers
and features in the continuous domain.
5 Experimentation framework
5.1 Metrics for adversarial attacks on tabular data
Success Rate : The success rate or fooling rate is a common metric to measure the efficiency of
an adversarial attack. Let us define the set Xˆ that comprises every tuple (x,x′) such that x ∈ X and
x′ is a successfully crafted adversarial example from x, that is: f(x) 6= f(x′).
For a given number of iterations N of Algorithm 1, we then define the success rate σN as:
σN =
|Xˆ|
|X|
Norms of perturbation : To evaluate how successful an attack is, we also measure the norm of
the adversarial perturbation.
||r||p
However, as discussed in Section 3, we measure the perceptibility of the perturbation by calculating
the weighted norm dv(r).
For both weighted and non-weighted perturbation norms we compute the mean value per pair of
datasets and method over the set of samples X.
Distance to the closest neighbor : Although perturbation norms allow us to compare methods
between one another, they do not give insight about how significant the perturbation is for a given
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dataset. To this end, we propose to compute the average weighted distance to the closest neighbor of
each original sample x. This metric helps us develop an intuition about what is the distance between
two points in the dataset and how it compares to the norm of the perturbation.
Formally, for a sample x ∈ RD we compute its closest neighbor as the following
neigh(x) = argmin
p∈X
dv(x− p)
5.2 Data
Datasets : We run experiments on four well-known datasets: German Credit dataset [Dua and
Graff, 2017], Australian Credit dataset [Dua and Graff, 2017], the Default Credit Card dataset [Yeh
and Lien, 2009] and the Lending Club Loan dataset [Kan, 2019]. They are all related to the financial
service industry, hence representing a good case study for the scenario we considered in Section 1.
Preprocessing : The proposed notion applies to numerical continous data. Hence, in our experi-
ments discrete features are treated as continous and non-ordered categorical features are dropped.
Each dataset is split into train, test and validation sets. Test and validation subsets respectively hold
250 and 50 samples. All the remaining samples are used to train the model. The test data is used to
generate the adversarial examples and the validation data used to optimize hyperparameters.
5.3 Parameters of the adversarial attack
Objective function : As described in Section 4, the objective function is defined as g(r) =
L(x+ r, t) + λ||v  r||p. We defined the loss function L as the the binary cross entropy function
and use the `2 norm to optimize the weighted norm ||v  r||2
Feature importance : In order to model the expert’s knowledge, we use the absolute value of the
Pearson’s correlation coefficient of each feature with the target variable t. We scale the obtained
feature importance vector v by multiplying it by the inverse of its `2 norm so as to feed the algorithm
with a unit vector, irrespective of the dataset at hand. More formally,
v =
|ρX,Y |
||ρX,Y ||22
where |u| = [|u0|, |u1|, . . . ]
It is important to note that the expert’s knowledge could be modelled using various other definitions.
Pearson’s correlation was chosen for its simplicity and its potential to replicate the intuition of an
expert through a linear correlation at the scale of the dataset.
Clipping : To make sure that the generated adversarial examples x′ lie in a coherent subspace
A ⊆ RD, we clip x′ to the bounds of each feature. More formally we constrain each feature
j ∈ [1 . . . D] to stay in their natural range [min(xj),max(xj)].
Machine Learning Model : For each dataset we build a fully connected neural network using
dense ReLU layers and a Softmax layer for the last one.
Comparison with other attacks: To the best of our knowledge, no method has been proposed to
generate adversarial examples of tabular data. We hence compare LowProFool against two other
methods that are FGSM [Goodfellow et al., 2015] and DeepFool [Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2015],
both being state-of-the-art baselines for gradient-based methods in the image domain. To do so, we
use the metrics defined in Section 5.1.
5.4 Experimental results
We report in Table 1 the results for the metrics defined in Section 5.1. The mean perturbation (Mean),
weighted mean perturbation (WMean) and distance to the closest neighbors (MDO) as well as its
weighted version (WMDO) are computed only for pairs of samples (x,x′) such that x is a sample
that belongs to the test set X and x′ is an adversarial example crafted from x that successfully crosses
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the classifier’s frontier, i.e. f(x) 6= f(x′). This allows us to compare the methods between each
other.
We observe that LowProFool succeeds in fooling the classifier (SR) almost 95% of the time. Only
one dataset shows lower performances with a success rate of 86%. DeepFool’s success rate is about
100% on each dataset while FGSM performs very poorly, from 0% to 59% success rate.
Then, comparing the mean `2 perturbation norm of DeepFool and LowProFool shows that DeepFool
always leads to better results. Averaging on the four datasets, the perturbation norm of LowProFool
is 1.7 times higher that DeepFool’s. FGSM shows order of magnitude larger perturbation norms that
the two other methods.
Looking at the weighted perturbation, we observe that DeepFool consistently leads to worst results
in comparison with LowProFool. We even get a ratio of 60% between the weighted mean norm of
LowProFool and DeepFool on the Default Credit Card dataset. Figure 3 is a diagrammatic comparison
of discrete results presented in Table 1 and allows better visual comparison between DeepFool and
LowProFool.
To get a feeling of what the mean perturbation norms represent for each dataset, i.e. what order
of magnitude are the perturbations, we compare them to the mean distance between each original
sample and their closest neighbor in terms of weighted (WMDO) and non-weighted (MDO) distance.
We observe in Figure 2 that except for the Australian Credit dataset, the mean perturbation norm
is in average 60% smaller than the mean distance to the closest neighbors and the weighted mean
perturbation norm 77% smaller than the mean weighted distance to the closest neighbors. On the
contrary, we observe that it takes a higher perturbation for adversarial examples to be generated on
the Australian Credit dataset. In fact in terms of weighted distance, the perturbation is four times
bigger than the distance to the closest neighbor. This relates with Table 1 in which we observe that
the Australian Credit dataset shows higher perturbation norms and distance to neighbors than any
other dataset studied.
credit-g defaultcredit australian loan
Dataset
42.9%
5.9%
381.8%
22.6%
70.2%
30.7%
189.8%
18.8%
100%
Ratio between LowProFool's mean perturbation
norm and mean distance to closest neighbor
Ratio between LowProFool's mean weighted perturbation
norm and mean weighted distance to closest neighbor
Figure 2: Comparison between the perturbation norm and the distance to the closest neighbor. Results
are shown as ratio between the mean (weighted) perturbation norm and the mean (weighted) distance
to the closest neighbor.
6 Discussion
We made the hypothesis in Section 1 that perturbations on less relevant features still allow to move
sufficiently an example in the feature space to get access to the desired opposed class label. The
reported results confirm our hypothesis to some extent. Indeed, we never achieve both 100% success
rate and satisfactory results on the weighted mean norm. However, aiming for a smaller success rate
of 95%, we reach low perturbation norm ratios between LowProFool and DeepFool.
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credit-g defaultcredit australian loan
Dataset
94.0%
85.9%
96.8% 94.8%
51.3%
40.0%
79.8%
58.3%
100%
Ratio between LowProFool's and DeepFool's success rate
Ratio between LowProFool's and DeepFool's mean weighted perturbation norm
Figure 3: Comparison between state-of-the-art DeepFool and LowProFool. The blue bars show the
ratio between the success rate of LowProFool and DeepFool. The red bars exhibit the ratio between
LowProFool mean weighted perturbation norm and DeepFool mean weighted perturbation norm.
Table 1: Results of the tests ran on the test set for each dataset. SR is the success rate defined in
Section 5.1. Mean and WMean respectively correspond to the mean norm of the perturbation and its
weighted equivalent as defined in Section 5.1. MDO and WMDO refer to the distance to the closest
at the original sample, based on a `2 distance and its weighted version dv as proposed in Section 5.1
D
at
as
et
Method SR Mean WMean MDO WMDO
G
er
m
an
C
. LowProFool 0.94 0.344 ± 0.282 0.039 ± 0.027 0.49 ± 0.193 0.091 ± 0.039
DeepFool 1.0 0.21 ± 0.181 0.076 ± 0.077 0.485 ± 0.193 0.089 ± 0.038
FGSM 0.192 19.69 ± 75.61 5.683 ± 21.827 0.477 ± 0.173 0.085 ± 0.037
D
ef
au
lt
C
. LowProFool 0.856 0.061 ± 0.109 0.002 ± 0.005 0.199 ± 0.137 0.034 ± 0.031
DeepFool 0.996 0.023 ± 0.026 0.005 ± 0.007 0.198 ± 0.132 0.036 ± 0.032
FGSM 0.588 1.122 ± 4.127 0.245 ± 0.901 0.207 ± 0.154 0.035 ± 0.032
A
us
tr
al
ia
n LowProFool 0.968 0.710 ± 0.530 0.21 ± 0.141 0.374 ± 0.188 0.055 ± 0.027
DeepFool 1.0 0.50 ± 0.349 0.263 ± 0.183 0.375 ± 0.189 0.055 ± 0.027
FGSM 0 – – – –
L
en
di
ng
L
. LowProFool 0.944 0.124 ± 0.168 0.014 ± 0.027 0.659 ± 0.207 0.062 ± 0.027
DeepFool 0.996 0.107 ± 0.154 0.024 ± 0.035 0.66 ± 0.209 0.062 ± 0.028
FGSM 0 – – – –
This intuitively results from the trade-off introduced with the objective function g defined in Section 4.
Take for instance a sample in the set of the original samples X that is far from the classifier frontier
and for which the closest path to reach the classifier frontier is along highly perceptible feature with
regards to the defined feature-importance vector v. It is not unexpected that in a fixed number of
iterations and given the fact that we highly penalize moves onto highly perceptible features, the
sample does not reach the classifier frontier.
Furthermore, the hyperparameters controlling the speed of move as well as the trade-off between
class-changing and minimizing the perceptibility value are fitted on the whole validation set. We
then believe that these hyperpameters do not generalize enough hence preventing a few outliers from
either crossing the classification frontier or minimizing enough their perceptibility value.
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To the contrary, the DeepFool method involves no hyperparameters. First, it adapts the speed of the
descent by scaling the perturbation with the norm of the difference of the logits towards the target and
towards the source. Intuitively, this means that when the sample is far from the classifier’s frontier,
the perturbation will be large, and will get smaller when the crafted adversarial examples gets close
to the frontier.
Second, the objective of the DeepFool algorithm is to minimize the `2 norm of the perturbation
under no constraint regarding the perceptibility of the perturbation. This naturally makes it easier for
DeepFool to generate adversarial example compared to LowProFool which also seeks to minimize the
norm of the Hadamard product between the feature importance vector v and the perturbation vector
r It is hence not surprising for LowProFool not to reach as good success rate results as DeepFool.
Concerning FGSM, it seems that we reach the limits of a method that worked sufficiently well on
images but is actually unsuccessful on tabular data.
The adversarial examples generated with LowProFool outperform DeepFool’s to a great extent in
terms of the perceptibility metrics defined in Section 5.1. What’s more, it did not cost much in terms
of lowering the success rate to reach those results. So not only can we generate adversarial examples
in the tabular domain using less important features to the eye of the expert at hand, but we can also
achieve great results in terms of imperceptibility of the attack. We believe that the existence of
these adversarial examples is directly tied to the discrepancy between the classifier’s learned feature
importance and the a priori feature importance vector v.
The comparison between the weighted mean norm and the distance to the closest neighbors reveals
that the generated adversarial examples are very close to their original example. For instance, the
average weighted perturbation represents only 5.9% of the average distance to the closest neighbor
for the Default Credit dataset. This behaviour is really desirable as it reinforces our belief that the
generated adversarial examples are closer to their original sample more than to any other sample
hence being the most imperceptible.
About coherence, we were worried that clipping a posteriori would introduce deadlocks. For instance,
take a sample for which the gradient of the objective function points towards a unique direction but
we restrict any move towards this direction (e.g. negative age). In practice, this behaviour did not
show.
7 Limitations and perspectives
Our approach constitutes a white-box attack as the attacker has access to the model as well as the
whole dataset. While a white-box attack often does not comply with real-world attacks, we believe
that it is achievable to perform a black-box attack by using a surrogate model under the assumption to
have a minimum number of queries allowed to the oracle. Papernot et al. showed they could achieve
a high rate of adversarial example misclassifications on online deep-learning APIs by creating a
substitute model to attack a black-box target model. To train the substitute model, they synthesize a
training set and annotated it by querying the target model for labels [Papernot et al., 2016]. Liu et al.
also showed that transferable non-targeted adversarial examples are easy to find [Liu et al., 2016].
We seek to investigate this area of research in the future steps. Indeed, black-box approaches would
allow us to build attacks that do not rely on gradient information as it is the case for LowProFool.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we have focused our attention on the notion of adversarial examples in the context
or tabular data. To the best of our knowledge, there has not been much focus on this data domain,
contrary to the images domain that attracted lots of attention. Images and tabular data do not share
the same perceptibility concepts and what has been formalized on images cannot be applied on
tabular data. We propose a formalization of the notion of perceptibility and coherence of adversarial
examples in tabular data, along with a method, LowProFool, to generate such adversarial examples.
Proposed metrics show successful results on the ability to fool the model and generate imperceptible
adversarial examples. Gradient-based methods such as LowProFool show limits when it comes to
discrete features. We will investigate new methods to answer this matter. While our proposition
remains subject to challenges, we believe it is a first step towards a more comprehensive and complete
view of the field of Adversarial Machine Learning.
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